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This research is one of the first attempts to investigate the proliferation of antidumping 
protection from the firm-level and, in particular, to study the reasons why the free-riding 
problem may be more or less severe in particular countries or industries.  Using a panel 
of data on the number of firms filing antidumping petitions in 10 countries between 1995 
and 2005, I study the determinants of the industry’s ability to overcome the free-riding 
problem.  I find clear evidence that more firms will participate in antidumping petitions 
the lower the cost of filing; these filing costs significantly decrease in such variables as 
the number of countries targeted at one time and the level of development of the country.  
There is little evidence, however, that firms perceive that the expected benefits of the 
petition will be higher if they choose to participate, thus alleviating the free-rider 
problem.  A separate statistical evaluation of actual case outcomes suggests that this 
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There has been an explosion of research in recent years documenting the increase in antidumping 
protection across the world.  Much of this research has focused on the macroeconomic and 
political determinants of the demand and supply of antidumping protection, such as how changes 
in the economic growth rate or average tariff rate in the importing country impacts the number of 
antidumping petitions considered by that country.  However, the decision to file for antidumping 
protection is made by individual firms, thus in order to fully understand the proliferation of 
antidumping protection one must look at the determinants of the firm-level decision.  
 
Unlike other forms of rent-seeking, all firms within an industry benefit from the imposition of 
most forms of trade protection, including antidumping protection.  However, only those who 
actively lobby for protection have to pay the costs of such rent-seeking.  As a result, trade 
protection, and antidumping protection in particular, has many of the same characteristics as 
public goods in the sense that an industry’s ability to seek protection will be plagued by the free-
rider problem.  In other words, firms prefer to let their competitors pay for the costs of filing for 
antidumping protection; industries in which all of the firms choose to free-ride off of the 
lobbying efforts of their competitors will not file for antidumping protection. 
 
The extent of the free-rider problem in antidumping filings can be seen in statistics on the 
number of firms filing individual antidumping petitions.  Figure (1) presents a histogram of the 
number of firms filing antidumping petitions in ten countries between 1995 and 2005.  Nearly 50 
percent of all antidumping petitions are filed by a single firm, while nearly three-quarters of all 
petitions are filed by fewer than three firms.
1  This fact could be due to two possible explanations 
related to the free-rider problem.  First, it is possible that the only industries that are able to 
overcome the free-rider problem to file for antidumping protection are industries with a small 
number of firms.  This possibility has been proposed in a number of theoretical papers of rent 
seeking such as Magee (2002).  Intuitively, in industries characterized by a small number of 
firms, the firm-specific benefits of protection are higher and concentrated among a few firms, 
thus increasing the incentives to lobby for protection.  In the most extreme case, monopolies are 
unable to free-ride on their competitors, thus they are guaranteed to file for protection as long as 
the expected benefits of the petition exceed the costs.  The second possibility is that few firms 
choose to contribute to the filing of antidumping petitions because the rest of the firms within the 
industry are rationally choosing to free-ride off of their competitors who are willing to pay the 
costs of the petition.
2 
 
Clearly the ability to overcome the free-rider problem will vary depending on industry-specific 
characteristics such as the level of competition within the industry.  This heterogeneity across 
industries can clearly be seen in Figure 2, which graphs the average number of firms 
participating in antidumping petitions filed by the 27 three-digit ISIC Rev. 2 industries included 
in this research.  There is clearly a large variation in the average number of firms filing petitions 
                                                 
1 The WTO antidumping agreement specifies that countries can only institute an antidumping investigation if it 
demonstrates that at least 25 percent of the industry is in support of the petition, or at least 50 percent of those firms 
in the industry that support or oppose the petition.  However, 25 percent of the industry does not actually have to file 
the petition, just be in favor of the protection requested by those filing the petition. 
2 An alternative explanation not related to free-riding may be that other firms in the industry are more competitive or 
more integrated in the global marketplace and, thus, are against the imposition of antidumping protection.   across industries, ranging from 1 in the mining industry to 7 in the fishing industry.  The total 
number of petitions filed by each industry, denoted by the numbers at the base of each column, 
also varies significantly; nearly 30 percent of all antidumping petitions are filed by the industrial 
chemical industry compared to only a single case by the mining industry.  It is reasonable to 
assume that the free-riding problem is less severe in industries that file a large number of 
antidumping petitions or in which a large number of firms choose to file for antidumping 
protection. 
 
Perhaps more surprising is that there appears to be heterogeneity in the ability of industries to 
overcome the free riding problem across countries.  Figure 3 graphs the average number of firms 
filing antidumping petitions in ten of the leading users of antidumping protection between 1995 
and 2005.  This average ranges from a low of 1.2 in Australia to a high of 5.7 in the European 
Union.  As has been well documented elsewhere, the total number of petitions filed in each 
country, which is reported in the base of each column, also varies significantly, with the most 
petitions filed in India, the United States, and the European Union.  As with the industries, one 
reasonable interpretation of these figures is that the free-riding problem is less severe in countries 
in which you see a large number of firms filing each petition or in countries that file a large 
number of petitions.  What is not clear from the statistics is what is driving this heterogeneity.  It 
may be possible, for example, that the heterogeneity across countries is driven in the industrial 
composition of production in the country.  Alternatively, the heterogeneity might be explained 
by characteristics of the antidumping petition process or the political system in the country that 
alter the costs and benefits of applying for protection. 
 
This research is one of the first attempts to investigate the firm-decision to file for antidumping 
protection and, in particular, to study the reasons why the free-riding problem may be more or 
less severe in particular countries or industries.  Using a panel of data on the number of firms 
filing antidumping petitions in 10 countries between 1995 and 2005, I study the determinants of 
the industry’s ability to overcome the free-riding problem.  I find clear evidence that more firms 
will participate in antidumping petitions the lower the cost of filing; these filing costs 
significantly decrease in such variables as the number of countries targeted at one time and the 
level of development of the country.  There is little evidence, however, that firms perceive that 
the expected benefits of the petition will be higher if they choose to participate, thus alleviating 
the free-rider problem.  A separate statistical evaluation of actual case outcomes suggests that 
this perception may be valid.     
 
II.  Literature Review 
 
As noted in the introduction, there is an increasing literature studying the determinants of the 
proliferation of antidumping protection in the world.  For example, Knetter and Prusa (2003) and 
Feinberg (2005) study some of the macroeconomic determinants of the number of petitions filed 
by individual countries in a given year, including changes in the country’s real exchange rate and 
its gross domestic product.   Feinberg and Reynolds (2006, 2007) find that the probability of an 
industry filing an antidumping petition against a particular trading partner increases if the trading 
partner filed antidumping actions against it in the previous year (a so called retaliation effect) 
and with the degree of tariff liberalization in the domestic industry. 
 However, these papers analyze antidumping filings from the point of view of a country or 
industry.  In fact, antidumping petitions are typically filed by a subset of firms within an 
industry.  In order to fully understand the proliferation of antidumping protection, it is important 
to understand how individual firms make the decision to file for protection.  In other words, it is 
important to understand why some industries are able to overcome the free-riding problem to file 
for protection, while others cannot.     
 
A number of theoretical papers have hypothesized as to why some industries are better able to 
overcome the free-rider problem and successfully lobby for protection.  For example, Grossman 
and Helpman (1996) find that sunset industries are better able to prevent new entrants and, thus, 
are better able to overcome the free-rider problem associated with collective actions.  Magee 
(2002) identifies conditions under which increasing the number of firms in an industry makes 
overcoming the free-rider problem more difficult; specifically, he finds that an increase in the 
number of firms (or a decrease in industry concentration) makes the free-rider problem more 
severe as long as the number of firms in the industry is “sufficiently large.” 
 
Only a handful of previous studies have developed theoretical models to evaluate the decision of 
individual firms to contribute to an antidumping petition in the face of free-riding.  For example, 
Herander and Pupp (1991) develop a model of firm decision making in which a representative 
firm will only voluntarily contribute to an antidumping petition if the expected benefits of 
contributing exceed the expected costs; in their model, the chief benefit of contributing to the 
petition is that it may increase the probability that the petition will be successful.  The authors 
hypothesize that the firm is more likely to believe that its contribution will significantly increase 
the probability of success if (1) it believe its interests are not being adequately represented by 
other firms or (2) its contribution increases the probability that the petition will be filed at all.   
 
Olson (2004) develops a similar model which hypothesizes that some industries are able to 
overcome the free-rider problem associated with filing an antidumping petition because the 
expected level of antidumping protection increases with the number of firms in the industry that 
actively file the petition.  In other words, the government is more likely to impose protection, or 
impose a higher level of protection, when a greater number of firms in the industry actively file 
the antidumping petition.  
          
Empirical tests seem to confirm some of these theoretical predictions.  Herander and Pupp 
(1991) find that the number of firms participating in steel antidumping petitions in the United 
States decreases with the expected costs per firm, as measured by the total number of petitions 
filed per firm in the industry.  They also find that the free-rider problem is less severe for 
industries where benefits are concentrated among a few large firms, as measured by the 
percentage of vertically integrated firms, and which are represented by a trade association.  Both 
Herander and Pupp (1991) and Olson (2004) find evidence that the level of protection awarded 
by the government significantly increases with the number of firms contributing to antidumping 
petitions in the United States.   
 
This research expands upon previous studies such as Herander and Pupp (1991) and Olson 
(2004) by investigating the heterogeneity across industries and countries in the ability of 
industries to overcome the free-riding problem and file for antidumping protection.  As described in more detail in the next section, I study the number of firms actively filing for antidumping 
protection in a panel of all antidumping petitions filed in 10 countries between 1995 and 2005 to 
make inferences about what factors make some industries more able to overcome the free-riding 
problem.  
 
III.  Model and Data 
 
Like Herander and Pupp (1991) and Olson (2004), I assume that firms will contribute to an 
antidumping petition only if the expected benefits from contributing exceed the expected costs.  
Firms derive benefits from contributing to the petition when the expected level of protection 
associated with filing the petition increases because of its participation.  In other words, define 
the expected net benefits (B*) of contributing to a petition for a representative firm as: 
 
Costs B B B B NC C C C NC C − − + − = ) ( ) ( * π π π  (1) 
 
where π represents the probability that the petition will be successful, B represents the increase in 
profits that would accrue to the firm following a successful petition, and the subscripts indicate 
whether the firm is choosing to contribute (C) or not contribute (NC) to the petition.   
 
In making their determination, the representative firm will believe that there are positive benefits 
from participating when (1) their participation significantly increases the likelihood that 
protection will be awarded, (2) their participation will significantly increase the level of 
protection that will be awarded by the government, or (3) both.  Note that even if the expected 
benefits of contributing are small, the firm may still contribute to the petition if the costs of 
participating are small.  The more firms that perceive that the benefits of contributing exceed the 
costs the easier it will be for the industry to escape the free-riding problem and the more firms 




The basis for the dependent variable used in this research, the number of firms filing each 
antidumping petition, is the list of domestic firms filing the antidumping petitions included in the 
Global Antidumping Database.
3  The database includes detailed information on all antidumping 
petitions filed by 19 of the leading users of antidumping, including the harmonized system (HS) 
codes and foreign firms targeted by each petition, the domestic firms filing each petition, and the 
petition outcomes.  The research presented here uses the petitions filed by ten of the leading 
users of antidumping since the formation of the World Trade Organization in 1995.
4 
 
I supplemented the information in the Database when necessary, particularly when the firms 
filing the petition were missing from the Database or the Database listed a trade association as 
the petitioner, using case information from each individual country.
5  Unfortunately I was unable 
to obtain petitioner information for 10.6 percent of the slightly more than 2,000 petitions filed 
                                                 
3 See Bown (2007) for a complete description of the database. 
4 Countries in this research include: Argentina, Australia, Canada, China, the European Union, India, Mexico, New 
Zealand, the United States, and South Africa. 
5 This supplemented petitioner information is available from the author upon request.  during my sample period.  In some cases, particularly in South Africa, I was unable to find the 
original case information to obtain the petitioner information.  In other cases, the investigating 
country chose not to release the names of the firms in the trade association filing the petition.
6   
 
I expect the number of firms participating in each petition to increase with the expected benefits 
to the representative firm and decrease with the expected costs of the petition.  The specific 




As indicated in equation (1), the expected benefits of contributing to the filing of a petition (B*) 
are a function of the benefits that accrue to the firm following the imposition of an antidumping 
duty if the petition is successful (B), the likelihood that the petition will be successful (π), and the 
firms’ perceived impact on the probability of success (        ) and level of protection 
          . 
 
Unfortunately, there is no clear way of measuring the firm’s perceived impact on the probability 
of success or the level of protection.  Instead, I include a number of variables that have been 
found to impact the probability of success in previous research as well as other variables that I 
expect impact the benefits accruing to the firm following imposition of a duty.  In this model, 
insignificant coefficients on these variables have two possible interpretations.  First, the variables 
may not impact the probability of success or the benefits accruing to the firm as surmised.  
Alternatively, these variables impact the probability of success or the level of benefits, but firms 
believe that their contribution to the petition would have little impact on the expected benefits 
from the petition.  If the later, the insignificant coefficients can be interpreted as an indication 
that firms within the industry have an incentive to free-ride.    
 
As shown in a number of previous studies, the likelihood of an affirmative injury determination 
increases in the value of imports of the product from the country under investigation.  For 
example, Reynolds (2009) finds that the likelihood of an affirmative injury determination 
increases in the targeted country’s share of the investigating country’s total imports of the 
product in most investigating countries and with the one-year growth in imports of the product 
from the targeted country in some investigating countries.
7  I calculate both measures using the 
commodity codes provided in the Global Antidumping Database and trade data from the United 




It is possible that macroeconomic conditions in the domestic economy could alter the probability 
that a petition will be successful.  For example, both Knetter and Prusa (2003) and Feinberg 
                                                 
6 The missing petitioner problem is most pronounced in investigations undertaken by Argentina (29 percent of 
cases) and the European Union (21 percent of cases).  Although the missing value problem could result in a 
selection bias in the results presented here, I leave investigating the extent of this bias to future research. 
7 Specifically, the share of imports had a significant positive impact on the likelihood of an affirmative 
determination in five of the nine countries studied in Reynolds (2009), while the one-year growth in imports had a 
significant positive impact on the likelihood of affirmative determination in the United States and European Union. 
8 I was unable to obtain import data for 66 of the petitions in the sample due primarily to changes in the trade 
classification system around the time of the petition.  These petitions are excluded from the analysis.  (2005) find that countries are more likely to file petitions following a real appreciation of a 
country's currency or a fall in the country's GDP growth, at least in Australia, Canada, European 
Union, and the United States.  The authors hypothesize that both factors make it more likely that 
the government will find that the domestic industry has been injured by imports from the foreign 
country, resulting in the imposition of antidumping duties.  To account for these macroeconomic 
determinants I include variables measuring the two year appreciation of the country’s exchange 
rate and growth in real GDP.
9 
 
The final variable that I include that could alter the probability of success is the average size of 
the industry, as measured by the log of the industry’s average value added over the period 1995 
to 2004.  Empirical studies of the likelihood of success of U.S. antidumping petition, such as 
Hansen (1990), have found some evidence that larger industries have more political sway and are 
better able to secure antidumping protection.  I calculate this variable using data from the World 
Bank’s Trade, Production and Protection Database.
10  Unfortunately, this variable suffers from a 
large miss-measurement problem.  Specifically, I have data not on the size of the specific 
industry filing the antidumping petition, but rather of the three-digit ISIC Rev. 2 industry        
 
I include two additional variables that I hypothesize could impact the benefits that would accrue 
to the firm following a successful petition.  One might also expect that the benefits of the petition 
would increase with the total value of imports from the country targeted in the petition.  Like the 
import-related variables discussed above, the UN’s Commodity Trade Statistics Database 
provides the import data for the six digit HS product targeted in the petition.  Finally, one might 
expect that the per firm benefits of the petition will fall with the total number of firms in the 
industry, or the more competitive the industry.  Although I do not observe the total number of 
firms in the industry, I include the number of establishments in the three-digit ISIC Rev. 2 
industry from the World Bank’s Trade, Production and Protection database to proxy for this 
possibility.




The costs associated with filing an antidumping petition are primarily legal costs that are fixed in 
the number of domestic firms filing the petition.  The industry must demonstrate the presence of 
less than fair value pricing on the part of the foreign industry, as well as that these unfair pricing 
strategies are causing injury to the domestic industry.  Typically an industry filing an 
antidumping petition will hire a single representative or counsel to assemble a petition on behalf 
of the entire industry.  Although I do not observe the actual costs of filing the petitions, the 
variables described below serve as proxies for the per firm costs of the petition as well as the 
coordination costs associated with organizing the industry to file the petition. 
                                                 
9  These variables are calculated using the real effective exchange rate index and constant GDP data, respectively, 
from the World Bank's World Development Indicators.  
10 See Nicita and Olarreaga (2006) for more information on this database.   I use the average over the period rather 
than the year-specific values because of the large number of missing values in the database.  Note that I take the 
average over just the non-missing values.  Unfortunately, the number of missing values, and the years for which the 
data is missing, does vary by country and industry but the resulting values should still serve as a proxy for the 
relative size of the industry within the investigating country. 
11 Like the value added variable, I use the average for the industry over the 1995-2004 period in order to minimize 
the number of missing values in the final dataset.  
In many instances, firms will file antidumping petitions against multiple countries at a time.  
Although each country targeted by the industry is counted as a separate petition, the average 
costs of filing against each additional country likely decreases with the number of countries 
targeted.  For example, in antidumping filings targeting multiple countries, firms submit pricing 
and cost information for each individual country but the information describing the economic 
conditions in the domestic industry only needs to be submitted once.  Previous research such as 
Hansen and Prusa (1996) and Tharakan et al. (1998), among others, have found that the 
likelihood an affirmative injury determination significantly increases if the government chooses 
to cumulate the imports from multiple countries when making their decision.
12  Given that the 
per petition filing costs are decreasing, while the expected benefits of the petition are increasing, 
in the number of countries targeted, one would expect the number of firms filing the petition to 
increase with the number of countries targeted simultaneously, as measured by the variable 
Multiple Cases.  I calculated this variable using the case information from the Global 
Antidumping Database. 
 
Contributions to non-firm entities such as labor unions would reduce per firm filing costs.  
Almost 5 percent of the petitions of the sample were filed in part by a labor organization.  While 
these entities are not included in the count of firms filing the petition, I include as an explanatory 
variable a dummy variable measuring whether the petition was filed by a labor organization.   
 
I also include whether the firms filed the petition as a trade association.  Firms who are already 
members of a trade association may find it less expensive to coordinate the firms within the 
industry to file an antidumping petition.  They may also find it easier to coerce firms within the 
industry to participate, thus avoiding the free riding problem.  Although in many cases the 
associations were formed long before the antidumping petition was filed, it is possible that in 
other cases the association was formed specifically with the intent of filing the antidumping 
petition. 
 
Finally, I include two country-specific factors that may impact the per firm costs of filing 
antidumping petitions.    First, one might expect the costs of filing for protection to vary by the 
level of democracy in the country.  For example, firms in highly democratic countries may have 
better access to legal representatives or be more familiar with compiling legal documents, thus 
reducing their filing costs.  I proxy for this possibility using the “Polity” variable from the Polity 
IV Project on Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions.  As explained in Marshall and 
Jaggers (2009), the polity variable is constructed by subtracting an index measuring the level of 
autocracy in the country from an index measuring the level of democracy in the country.  The 
resulting measure ranges from +10 (strongly democratic) to -10 (strongly autocratic).   
 
For similar reasons, one might expect the per firm filing costs to be a function of the level of 
development of the country.  The more developed countries in my sample, including the United 
                                                 
12 The WTO’s Antidumping Agreement allows investigating authorities to cumulatively assess the impact of imports 
from multiple countries targeted by simultaneous antidumping petitions on the domestic industry as long as such 
cumulation is appropriate under the conditions of competition between the imported products and domestic 
producers.  This cumulation procedure was used by both the United States and European Union prior to passage of 
the WTO’s Antidumping Agreement. States, Canada, European Union, and Australia, also have a longer history of using antidumping 
protection than the less developed countries such as India and China, which could result in lower 
filing costs for the firms within these countries.  I measure the level of development using GDP 
per capita data from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators.         
 




As illustrated in Figure 1, the number of firms choosing to actively participate in antidumping 
petitions ranged from 0 to 17.  Nearly 50 percent of all petitions were filed by a single firm, 
while the average number of firms filing these petitions was 2.86.  This data can clearly be 
described as a discrete count of the number of participating firms, which by definition must be 
truncated at zero.  As a result of this distribution, treating the data using linear regression models 
would result in biased estimates.  Instead, I estimate the parameters of the model using a panel 
count model. 
 
As discussed above, the number of firms filing each petition will increase as the expected net 
benefits of filing, modeled in equation (1), increase.  Define the dependent variable yijp as the 
number of firms in country j and industry i filing petition p and µijp as the expected number of 
firms that will file this petition.
13  These variables can be defined by the expressions: 
 
              (2) 
 
ln                          (3) 
 
where δij includes all unobserved factors about country i and industry j that alter the net benefits 
of filing the petition, wij and xijp are vectors of observed country and industry-specific factors and 
case-specific factors, respectively, that alter the net benefits of filing, and γ and β are vectors of 
parameters to be estimated.  In the Poisson regression model, the dependent variable is assumed 
to follow a Poisson distribution with parameter µijp, which results in the following probability for 
each observation: 
 
Pr         ,       
               
    
          . (4) 
   
 
One problem with the Poisson count model is that it assumes that the mean of the dependent 
variable equals the variance, or E(yijp)=var(yijp)=µijp.  Both the summary statistics and statistical 
tests suggest that the data in this sample exhibits over dispersion, or that var(yijp)>E(yijp).
14  One 
                                                 
13 In this research, the industry i is defined by the three digit ISIC Rev. 2 category of the more specific industry 
filing the petition.   
14 The variance of the number of firms filing antidumping petitions is 7.25, compared to the mean of 2.86.  
Goodness of fit tests on the pooled sample rejects the use of the Poisson model in favor of a model that accounts for 
over dispersion.  potential solution to this problem is to introduce a gamma distributed error to account for the 
over dispersion; the resulting model is known as the negative binomial model.  
 
The unobserved heterogeneity in the model, as captured in the variable δij, further complicates 
estimation.  As in most panel regressions, unobserved heterogeneity can be modeled as a fixed 
effect or a random variable that follows some known distribution.  Although random effects can 
be more efficient in some cases, if the unobserved component δij is correlated with the 
explanatory variables use of the random effects model will result in biased coefficient estimates.  
Hausman tests suggest in this case that random effects are inappropriate. 
 
The fixed effects negative binomial model included in many statistical packages such as Stata is 
one formulated in Hausman, Hall and Griliches (1984).  The following equations represent one 
way to describe their proposed model: 
 
ln                    
 
                   (5) 
 
            1                
 
Hausman, Hall and Griliches (1984) propose estimating the model by conditioning on the total 
number of firms filing all petitions within a particular industry and country, thereby eliminating 
the fixed effects.  As discussed in both Allison and Waterman (2002) and Greene (2007), the 
problem with this model is that the country-industry specific fixed effects do not act as a fixed 
effect as we traditionally think of them—they do not represent unobserved factors that alter the 
average number of firms filing each petition as the other explanatory variables do.  Instead the 
fixed effects in this model measure unobserved heterogeneity in the variance of the number of 
firms. 
 
Instead, I follow the suggestion in Allison and Waterman (2002) and Greene (2007), and 
estimate an unconditional fixed effects negative binomial estimator.  Specifically, I estimate a 
negative binomial model with the mean and variance defined by: 
 
ln                                
 
      |   ,             
 
            ,             1          (6) 
 
In this model, the error εijp is a gamma distributed error with a mean of one and a variance equal 
to κ 
 
 .  The probability of each observation is defined as: 
 
Pr         ,       
             
          
    
              ,       
 
      
 (7) 
 As in other fixed effects models, one of the main drawbacks of this approach is that it is 
impossible to estimate the parameters on the petition-invariant variables included in the vector 
wij.  Because I am particularly interested in country and industry specific factors that might 
mitigate the free rider problem, in alternative specifications I present a random effects model 
with country and industry specific variables despite the fact that Hausman tests suggest that 
correlation between the random effect and the explanatory variables may result in biased results.  
The parameter estimates are for the most part fairly stable across specifications.     
 
Other Empirical Problems 
 
In a perfect world, the empirical model described above would provide reliable estimates of what 
drives firms to participate in antidumping petitions.  In particularly, I hypothesize that the free-
riding problem is less severe in those industries in which we see more firms choosing to actively 
participate in antidumping petitions.  Thus if the parameter estimates indicate that an increase in 
the explanatory variable will increase the expected number of firms participating in the 
antidumping petition, I can interpret this to mean that an increase in the variable increases the net 
benefits of participating, thus diminishing the free-rider problem.  Unfortunately, this hypothesis, 
and the proposed empirical model, suffers from two major short comings. 
 
Perhaps the biggest problem with the analysis is that I do not observe one of the most important 
determinants of the number of firms choosing to file for antidumping protection—the total 
number of firms in the industry.
15  To better illustrate how this omitted variable alters the 
interpretation of my results, consider the two following extreme examples.  First, assume that 
there are 10 firms in all of the industries filing antidumping petitions in the sample; the more 
firms that I observe filing the antidumping petitions, the fewer free-riders in the industry.  In this 
example, the parameters of the model estimate the impact of the explanatory variables on the 
ability of the industry to prevent free-riders, as I hypothesize.  The industry/country fixed effects 
control for unobserved factors that influence the ability to overcome the free-rider problem. 
 
In contrast, assume that all firms opt to participate in all of the antidumping petitions in the 
sample; in other words, there are no free-riders.  In this case, the parameter estimates from the 
empirical model are really measuring the impact of the explanatory variables on the total number 
of firms in industries filing for antidumping protection.  For example, the total number of firms 
might be lower in those industries with a great deal of import competition.   
 
A second and related problem with the analysis is that the parameter estimates may suffer from a 
significant selection bias issue.  In other words, the sample used in this analysis includes only 
those industries that have actually filed for antidumping protection; it excludes all those 
industries that were unable to overcome the free-rider problem or those that failed to file for 
protection.  The parameter estimates could be biased if the explanatory variables are correlated 
with some common, unobserved characteristics associated with the industries in this sample that 
lead them to apply in the first place.  For example, it is highly likely based on theoretical models 
of rent seeking that all of industries filing antidumping petitions are characterized by a small 
                                                 
15 A better empirical model to analyze what factors allow firms to overcome the free rider problem, for example, 
might measure the impact of various explanatory variables, including the total number of firms in the industry, on 
the proportion of firms in the industry choosing to file for antidumping protection.   number of firms.  If the total number of firms in the industry is correlated with particular 
explanatory variables, such as whether the industry is represented by a trade association, then the 
parameter on this explanatory variable will be biased. 
 
Data limitations currently prevent me from correcting for either of these problems.  Thus the 
results presented below must be viewed with these potential problems in mind.  
 
IV.  Results 
 
Incidence rate ratios (IRR) from the unconditional negative binomial fixed effects model are 
presented in Column 1 of Table 2.  Similar to a marginal effect, the IRR is the ratio of the counts 
predicted by the model when the variable is one unit above its mean (and all other variables are 
at their means) to the count when all variables are at their means.  Thus an incident rate ratio of 
1.1 indicates that a one unit increase in the variable results in a 10 percent increase in the number 
of firms filing the petition, while an IRR of 0.9 indicates that a one unit increase in the variable 
results in a 10 percent decrease in the number of firms filing the petition.  The z-statistics are 
reported for a test of the null hypothesis that the IRR=1, which would indicate no relationship 
between the variable and the number of filing firms. 
 
A number of the variables that I hypothesized would impact the probability that the antidumping 
petition would be successful are statistically significant.  Recall that I proposed that this 
theoretically indicates that firms believe that their individual contributions will significantly 
increase the benefits from the petition.   
 
Complicating this analysis, however, is the fact that the variables do not have the expected sign.  
In other words, if firms believe that their contribution will significantly increase the benefits 
accruing to the firm from a successful antidumping petition (           in equation (1)), then 
one would expect the number of firms to increase with those factors that increase the probability 
that the petition will be successful, such as the targeted countries share of or growth in imports.  
Instead, the empirical results suggest that the number of firms significantly decreases in these 
variables.  For example, the results suggest that a one percentage point increase in the targeted 
country’s share of imports decreases the number of participating firms by nearly 30 percent.  One 
possible explanation for this seemingly contradictory result is that the higher the expected 
probability that the petition will be successful, the less likely it is that firms will believe that their 
individual contribution will increase the expected benefits of the petition, or the more likely it is 
that firms will free-ride off of their competitors.
16 
 
Knetter and Prusa (2003) and Feinberg (2005) both find that countries are more likely to file 
antidumping petitions (i.e. the total number of antidumping petitions filed in a country increases) 
following an appreciation of a country’s currency.  Both papers hypothesize that this result is due 
to the fact that the probability that an antidumping petition will be successful increases as the 
country’s currency appreciates.  The results from this research seem to support this conclusion, 
as a one percentage point increase in the country’s exchange rate results in a 40 percent increase 
in the number of firms filing for protection. 
                                                 
16 This result is similar in nature to the result in Herander and Pupp (1991), who found a negative (but insignificant) 
impact of the import penetration ratio on the number of participating firms.  
Neither the GDP growth rate not the total value of imports proved to be significant determinants 
of the number of firms participating in antidumping petitions. 
 
Two of the variables that I include to proxy for the costs of filing for antidumping protection 
prove to be significant determinants of the number of firms participating in antidumping 
protection.  As expected, industries represented by a trade association have 63 percent more 
firms contributing to their antidumping petitions.  The number of firms choosing to contribute to 
an antidumping petition increases by 2.7 percent for every additional country targeted by the 
industry at a given time—in other words, the number of firms increases as the cost of the 
country-specific petition falls.  The other case-specific variable that I proposed may change per 
firm costs, participation by a union, was insignificant. 
 
Although statistical tests of the pooled dataset suggested that the data exhibited over dispersion, 
thus requiring the use of a negative binomial count model, the results from this estimation 
instead indicate that the negative binomial parameter which measures the degree of over 
dispersion is insignificant.  In fact, the results from an unreported fixed effect Poisson model are 
virtually identical to the negative binomial results presented here.  A visual inspection of the data 
confirms this dichotomy.  Although there is over dispersion in the sample as a whole, the number 
of firms participating in antidumping petitions filed by individual industries and countries does 
not exhibit over dispersion.  Thus, once unobserved industry and country characteristics are 
accounted for in the panel estimation, use of a negative binomial proves unnecessary. 
 
As mentioned above, although the fixed effect model presents consistent and unbiased results, 
the downfall of the model is that I am unable to include industry and country specific 
characteristics that may prove interesting.  I have not yet found a statistical method of estimating 
these case-invariant characteristics while still using fixed effects.  Thus, in columns 2 through 4, 
I explore possible causes for heterogeneity using the results from a random effects Poisson 
model, where the random effects are modeled as a log gamma distributed error. 
 
Column 2 includes identical explanatory variables as the negative binomial specification 
included in Column 1.  Although the results are slightly different from the unbiased results from 
the negative binomial regression, most of this analysis is qualitatively the same as discussed 
above. 
 
Column 3 includes the results of the random effects Poisson model using the same sample but 
with the addition of two country-specific variables, the GDP per capita and the level of 
democracy of the country.  While the level of democracy proves to be insignificant, the results 
suggest that the number of firms participating in antidumping petitions significantly increases in 
the level of development of the country.  Specifically, I find that a one hundred percent increase 
in the country’s GDP per capita (or a one unit increase in the log of the GDP per capita) 
increases the number of participating firms by 12.6 percent.  As noted above, the more developed 
countries in the sample have a longer history of use of antidumping protection; this result could 
indicate simply that industries with more experience using antidumping have lower costs of 
filing.  Alternatively, it may be that more developed countries are characterized by firms with more legal knowledge, thus reducing the costs of filing.  Most of the other parameters exhibit the 
same qualitative results as discussed above. 
 
Finally, the specification presented in Column (4) includes two industry-specific variables, the 
size of the industry as measured by its value added and the number of establishments in the three 
digit ISIC Rev. 2 industry.  Unfortunately, inclusion of these two variables significantly reduces 
the sample due to the large number of missing values; sample differences could be driving the 
large number of differences from previous specifications.  Although I still find that participation 
in a trade association increases the number of firms participating in antidumping petitions, none 
of the other variables that were significant in Specifications 1- 3 prove to be significant here.   
 
Instead, I find that the number of firms increases in both the size of the industry and the number 
of establishments in the industry.  Recall that I hypothesized that the probability of a successful 
antidumping petition would increase with the size of the industry, but that the benefits accruing 
to the firm would decrease in the number of establishments as the benefits are spread over a 
larger number of firms.  Although these results seem to confirm my hypothesis regarding the size 
of the industry, they also suggest that the probability of a successful petition may increase with 
the number of establishments in the industry.  Whether these results are being driven by sample 
selection bias or correlation of the random effect with the added explanatory variables remains to 
be explored.         
 
Free-Riding and the Supply of Protection 
 
The results presented above provide only weak evidence that firms believe that the probability 
that a petition will be successful, or the level of protection that will result from a successful 
petition, will increase with their participation.  For example, I hypothesized that an appreciation 
of the exchange rate increases the probability that the petition will be successful; this will 
increase the number of firms filing the petition if firms believe that their contribution will 
increase the level of protection resulting from the successful petition.  Parameter estimates 
indicate that the number of firms participating in antidumping petitions increases with an 
appreciation of a country’s exchange rate.   
 
In contrast, none of the other variables that I use to proxy for the expected benefits of the petition 
proved to be significant and of the hypothesized sign.  The majority of parameter estimates, 
therefore, suggest instead that firms do not believe that their contribution will significantly alter 
the outcome of the petition.  To further explore the accuracy of these beliefs, I use a probit model 
to estimate the economic and political determinants of injury decisions in antidumping cases in a 
pooled sample of case outcomes in seven of the countries in my sample.
17   
 
The explanatory variables and methodology are identical to those used in Reynolds (2009), 
which studies country-specific differences in antidumping injury determinations.  However, to 
explore whether individual firms can alter the likelihood that a petition will be successful, I also 
include the number of firms filing the petition as an explanatory variable.     
 
                                                 
17 The seven countries included in this sample are those countries that are included in both Reynolds (2009) and this 
research, including Argentina, Australia, Canada, the European Union, India, Mexico, and the United States. The coefficient and elasticity estimates from the pooled sample are included in Table 3.  Like 
Reynolds (2009), to account for common, unobserved determinants of the injury decision in each 
country, I use a random effects probit model and include year-specific dummy variables to 
account for global macroeconomic conditions.  Surprisingly, the results suggest that instead of 
increasing the likelihood that a petition will be successful, the likelihood that the petition is 
successful decreases with each additional firm that contributes to the petition.  Specifically, the 
elasticity estimates suggest that a one percent increase in the number of firms filing the petition 
results in a 0.6 percent decrease in the likelihood that the petition will be successful. 
 
Country-specific regressions such as those carried out in Reynolds (2009) result in similar 
elasticity estimates.
18  Specifically, the number of petitions firms was an insignificant factor in 
petition outcomes in five of the seven countries in my sample.  In the remaining two countries, 
Australia and the United States, the number of petition firms had a negative and significant 
impact on the likelihood of an affirmative injury determination.  Note that this result is in direct 
contrast to the result in Herander and Pupp (1991), which found a positive and significant impact 
of the number of firms on case outcomes in those cases filed by the steel industry between 1982 
and 1986.
19  It is unclear what could be driving this contradictory result.  One possibility is the 
suggestion of other political economy studies of trade protection which suggest that more 
concentrated industries have more political power and, thus, are better able to secure trade 
protection.    
 
The other parameters prove to be qualitatively the same as those discussed in Reynolds (2009).  
On average the likelihood that a petition will be successful increases in market share of the 
targeted country, the number of cumulated cases, and the economic growth rate in the targeted 
country.  Cases filed against non-market economies are more likely to be successful.   
 
Although I hypothesized that an appreciation of a country’s currency would increase the 
likelihood that a petition would be successful, both the analysis presented here and the analysis 
discussed in Reynolds (2009) instead suggests that the likelihood that a petition will be 
successful decreases with an appreciation of the currency.  This result calls into question what 
little evidence this research found that firms may believe that their individual contribution could 
significantly alter the outcome of the petition.   
 
V.  Conclusion 
 
This research is one of the first attempts to investigate the proliferation of antidumping 
protection from the firm-level and, in particular, to study the reasons why the free-riding problem 
may be more or less severe in particular countries or industries.  Using a panel of data on the 
number of firms filing antidumping petitions in 10 countries between 1995 and 2005, I study the 
determinants of the industry’s ability to overcome the free-riding problem.   
 
I find clear evidence that more firms will participate in antidumping petitions the lower the cost 
of filing.  I show that filing costs significantly decrease in such variables as the number of 
countries targeted at one time and whether or not the industry is represented by a trade 
                                                 
18 Results from these regressions are available from the author upon request. 
19 Limiting my sample to U.S. steel cases filed between 1995 and 2005 fails to significantly change the results. association.  I also find some indication that there may be some heterogeneity in filing costs 
across countries.  Specifically, the results suggest that filing costs decrease in the level of 
development of the country.  This may be due to the fact that more developed countries have a 
longer history of antidumping use, thus firms farther along the antidumping “learning curve” 
have lower costs.  Alternatively, more developed countries may have a more developed legal 
structure that results in lower costs.   
 
In contrast, I find little evidence that firms perceive that the expected benefits of the petition will 
be higher if they choose to participate, which would alleviate the free-rider problem.  A separate 
statistical evaluation of actual case outcomes suggests that this perception may be valid.  Using a 
sample of injury determinations in seven countries, I find that on average the likelihood that an 
antidumping petition will be successful decreases in the number of firms that file the petition.  
This result is particularly pronounced in Australia and the United States. 
 
Econometric problems make further analysis difficult, but heterogeneity in the firm-level filing 
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Number of Participating Firms 
Figure 2 
Average Number of Participating Firms by Industry
a 
 
a Industries defined by three-digit ISIC Rev. 2 descriptions.  Values at base of column measure 
the total number of petitions filed by the industry. 
  











































































































































































































































































































































































































































Average Number of Firms Filing Antidumping Petitions, 1995-2005
a 
 
a Values at base of column measure the total number of petitions filed by the industry. 
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Variable  Mean Std. Dev Min   Max 
Number of Firms  2.92 2.71 0.00  17.00
Association  0.10 0.30 0.00  1.00
Union  0.05 0.22 0.00  1.00
Cumulated Cases  4.35 3.45 1.00  20.00
Log(Imports)  14.20 4.58 0.00  22.97
Target's Share of Imports  0.14 0.19 0.00  1.32
Target's One-Year Import Growth -0.11 3.33 -17.23  21.72
GDP Growth  0.08 0.05 -0.16  0.20
Exchange Rate Appreciation  0.03 0.14 -0.26  1.12
Log(GDP per Capita)  8.76 1.63 5.92  10.52
Polity  8.07 4.50 -7.00  10.00
Log(Value Added)  15.40 1.50 11.45  18.68
Log(Number of Establishments) 7.74 1.71 2.77  12.06
 
  Table 2 








Target's Share of Imports  0.748**  0.665**  0.676** 0.807 
   (2.42) (3.48) (3.35) (1.42) 
Target's One-Year Import Growth  0.991* 0.990**  0.991 0.991 
   (1.71) (1.75) (1.64) (1.26) 
GDP Growth  3.508 2.485  3.637* 0.302 
   (1.54) (1.32) (1.76) (0.96) 
Exchange Rate Appreciation  1.408* 1.166  1.277 0.887 
(1.75) (0.83) (1.31) (0.40) 
Log(Imports)  1.007 1.011**  1.010** 1.003 
   (1.64) (2.48) (2.30) (0.52) 
Log(Value Added)  1.153** 
(2.97) 
Log(Number of Establishments)  1.155** 
(2.45) 
Costs 
Association  1.630** 1.674**  1.677** 2.388** 
   (9.15) (10.04) (10.07) (12.19) 
Union  1.070  1.100  1.089
   (0.98) (1.41) (1.25)
Cumulated Cases  1.027** 1.028**  1.028** 1.001 
   (5.23) (5.55) (5.54) (0.11) 
Log(GDP per Capita)  1.126** 1.025 
(2.91) (0.46) 
Polity  0.981 0.972 
(1.15) (1.56) 
θ 0.000  0.367** 0.330** 0.174** 
(0.00)  (7.27) (7.02) (4.97) 
Number of observations  1,662 1,662  1,662 985 
Number of groups  142 142  142 90 
Fixed Effects  Yes No  No No 
a Z-statistics reported in parentheses. *, ** denote those parameters significant at the 10 and 5 
percent level, respectively.   
b Incident Rate Ratios from the estimation of a non-conditional, fixed effects negative binomial 
regression.  Fixed Effects not reported. 
c Incident Rate Ratios from the estimation of a random effects Poisson regression with a log-
gamma distributed error with parameter θ. 
  Table 3 
Determinants of Injury Decisions 
Variable Parameter Elasticity 
Number of Petitioning Firms -0.3073***    -0.5911* 
 (0.1024)  (0.3134) 
Exporter’s Share of Imports  0.9581***  1.8428* 
 (0.3279)  (0.9684) 
One-Year Growth in Imports  0.0671  0.1291 
 (0.2985)  (0.5765) 
Cumulated Cases
a 0.6023***  1.1584*** 
 (0.1051)  (0.4942) 
Nonmarket Economy
a 0.4522***  0.8697*** 
 (0.1322)  (0.4244) 
Exporter’s GDP per Capita  -1.8374  -3.5339 
 (4.6645)  (9.0870) 
Exchange Rate Change  -0.4977*  -0.9572 
 (0.2895)  (0.6605) 
Importer’s GDP Growth  -0.4856  -0.9340 
 (1.9827)  (3.8589) 
Exporter’s GDP Growth  1.8258***  3.5118* 
 (0.8329)  (2.1254) 
Developing Country
a 0.1611  0.3099 
 (0.4277)  (0.8336) 
Industry’s Share of Total  -0.1181  -0.2271 
  Employment  (0.1839)  (0.3711) 
Five-Year Decrease in Tariffs -1.3358  -2.5711 
 (1.1072)  (2.3572) 
    
Year Fixed Effects  Yes   
No. of Observations  1,056   
Notes: Standard Errors reported in parentheses.  *, **, and *** denote p-values less than 0.10, 
0.05 and 0.01, respectively.  
a
 Reported elasticities measure the percent change in the likelihood 
of an affirmative injury determination for a discrete change in the dummy variable. 
 